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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY OF
AGRICULTURE AND APPLIED
SCIENCE, a Utah body
politic and corporate,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
BOSWORTH, SULLIVAN AND
COMPANY,

Case No. 16274

Defendant-Appellant,
vs.
PHILLIP A. BULLEN, et al.
Third-Party
Defendants-Respondents,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
BOSWORTH, SULLIVAN AND COMPANY

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by Utah State University (hereinafter the "University") to recover monies from defendant
Bosworth, Sullivan and Company (hereinafter "Bosworth"), a
securities brokerage house, for losses allegedly sustained
by the University arising out of securities bought and sold
on behalf of the University by Bosworth.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Bosworth filed third-party claims of indemnity and contribution against University officials who authorized the
University's purchase and sale of securities.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On March 18, 1977, the Court entered an Order denying
Bosworth's Motion for Change of Venue from the First Judicial
District Court of Cache County.

(R.

189).

On July 22, 1977, the Court denied Bosworth's Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint.
On March 21, 1978 and on May 1, 1978, the Court granted
Third-Party Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, and on January
3, 1979, the Court granted the University's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of liability.

(R.

771, 870, 999).
Bosworth here appeals from the Orders listed above.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Bosworth seeks reversal of the Order denying Bosworth's
Motion to Dismiss the University's First Amended Complaint.
In the alternative, Bosworth seeks reversal of (1) the Order
granting the University's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,
(2) the Order dismissing Bosworth's Third-Party Complaint,
and (3) the Order denying Bosworth's Motion for Change of
Venue.

-2-
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I

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In mid-1970, the University began a program of investing
part of its funds in securities.

This was accomplished, in

part, through the use of various stock brokerage houses, one
of which was Bosworth.

The investment program was prompted

primarily by (1) criticism by the State Auditor's office in
1970 directed at the University for leaving large amounts of
funds in non-interest-bearing bank accounts (Catron 44) and
(2) a two percent cut in the University's budget in the
summer of 1970.

(Deposition Ex. 4).

The University's investment program was expressly
adopted and authorized by the University's Institutional
Council (Deposition Exs. 7, 8, 9 and 33).
Donald A. Catron, the University's Controller since
April, 1970, was given unlimited control over the investment
program.

During the period from mid-1970 to March, 1973,

Catron caused the University, through various broker-agents,
including Bosworth, to buy and sell hundreds of securities
involving millions of the University's dollars.
Shortly after the investment program was implemented,
Catron and others from the University attended an investment
seminar in San Francisco sponsored by the Ford Foundation on
the subject of securities investments by universities.
(Deposition Ex.

17).

-3-
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Rex A. Plowman, a member of the University's Institutional
Council and the then newly formed investment committee and
also one of those attending the Ford Foundation seminar, gave
an oral report of the seminar to the entire Institutional
Council on February 23, 1971.

(Deposition Ex. 96).

Three of the themes advanced by the Ford Foundation at
the seminar influenced and became a part of the University's
investment program.

One theme was that in the past those

who managed portfolios of educational institutions had lost
more money, because of inflation, by being conservative
in securities investments than by being agressive, and that
portfolio managers should move from fixed income securities
to equity securities, i.e., to stocks.

In particular, the

Ford Foundation report stated that, following World War II,:
Far-sighted investors began to regard good
common stocks as a better haven than bonds for
funds seeking protection of purchasing power
without material sacrifice of liquidity . . . .
We conclude that, whatever may happen in the
future, endowment managers should free themselves
of rigid rules on the holding of bonds.
(Deposition Ex. 96 at 16).
The Ford Foundation report also recommended that institutions not be restricted to "conventional blue chips" in
common stock investments.

(Deposition Ex. 96).

A third theme of the Ford Foundation report was
that decisions to purchase or sell particular securities

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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should be delegated to a single manager with regular review
by the institution's trustees.

(Broadbent 100).

On January 20, 1972, the Institutional Council held a
regular meeting with 18 high-ranking members of the University present.

A motion was made, seconded and passed ap-

proving a corporate resolution authorizing Dee A. Broadbent,
University Vice President, and Catron "to purchase, trade,
and sell, long or short, transfer and assign, stocks, bonds
and securities of every nature on margin or otherwise".

By

its terms, the resolution was to "remain in full force and
effect until written notice of revocation hereof shall be
delivered to the brokers".

(Deposition Ex. 33).

At that meeting, there was absolutely no mention by
anyone present about whether the University had the legal
power to enter into such a resolution.

The resolution was

approved without a dissenting vote.
In February, 1972, Catron, pursuant to the resolution,
opened an account on behalf of the University with Bosworth
by signing a customer account card.

Prior to, or at the

time the account was opened, Bosworth asked for and received
from the University a copy of the resolution of the Institutional Council authorizing Catron to purchase common stock.
(R. 919).

Bosworth relied upon the resolution which was certified
by the Secretary of the Institutional Council, L. Mark
-5-
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Neuberger.

Without the resolution, Bosworth would not have

dealt with Catron or anyone else on behalf of the University.
(R. 920).
After February, 1972, Bosworth executed trades at the
request and on behalf of the University, the first taking
place on February 1, 1972.

Many of the trades occurred

after December, 1972, the last trade occurring on March 7,
1973.

In each instance, Bosworth acted as an agent of the

University, rather than as a principal.

(R. 921).

In the spring of 1972, until Catron was suspended in
March, 1973, the Institutional Council, the Board of Regents
and the University Administration received monthly reports
of investments purchased, and the amount of the entire
investment portfolio.

(Catron 146; Neuberger 15).

Throughout 1972, the Institutional Council gave wholehearted support and assistance to Catron.

The minutes of the

Institutional Council reflect that on February 15, 1972,
Catron gave a report of the investment program and all
present agreed that the project was being handled in a very
satisfactory manner.

(Deposition Ex. 85c).

The minutes of a June 23, 1972, Institutional Council
meeting reflect that at a meeting of the Investment Committee the evening before, Catron had demonstrated the use of a
ticker tape which had been installed in his office.

Mr. J.

D. Harris, a member of both the Institutional Council and

-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Investment Committee, reported in that meeting that he
was more convinced than ever that the University was moving
in the right direction.

(Deposition Ex. 41 and 42).

On July 29, 1972, Harris reported to the Institutional
Council that the Investment Committee had received a report
of the earnings on investments for the past year and expressed the feeling that the investment staff was doing a
remarkable job.

(Deposition Ex. 44).

Not until December, 1972, did anyone at the University
question the legality or validity of the University's
investment program.

In late 1972, an audit of the Univer-

sity was begun by the private accounting firm of Ernst &
Ernst.

The acocunting firm questioned the validity of

investments being made by the University and sought an
opinion from the Utah Attorney General's office.

(Broad-

bent 260-261).
During this period of time, Catron continued to purchase
securities through Bosworth.

(R. 77).

On January 10, 1973, the Instutitional Council reviewed
a letter written by Mr. H. Wright Volker, Assistant Attorney
General, to Mr. Sherman J. Preece, State Auditor, which
questioned the validity and legality of the University's
investments.

However, investments continued to be made

through Bosworth by Catron.

No one from the Institutional

-7-
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Council, the President's office, or the Attorney General's
office notified Bosworth of the questions raised as to the
legality of the investment program.
Catron was fired in March, 1973.

The officers of the

University and members of the Institutional Council were not
clear as to what instructions Catron had been given from
December, 1972, to March, 1973.

Some of the members and

officers believed Catron was given instructions to follow
the "prudent man" rule in liquidating stocks while others
thought that he had been instructed to stop purchasing
stocks.

(Broadbent 203).

Bosworth was informed for the

first time on March 20, 1973, that Catron's authority on
behalf of the University had been withdrawn.

(Deposition

Ex. 63).
Mr. Catron testified in his deposition that no one
instructed him not to purchase common stocks after December,
1972, even though the University had received Mr. Volker's
opinion.

Q.

Was it your understanding prior to March 1,
1973, that during the period December, 1972,
to March 1, 1973, that you were not to purchage common stocks for the investment portfolio of Utah State University out of public
monies?

A.

What were those dates again?

Q.

December 1, 1972, to March 1, 1973.

-8-
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A.

No.

Q.

That was not your understanding?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And to make sure that it's clear, you have
no recollection of ever receiving such instructions either from Mr. Broadbent or
President Taggart or any member of the
Institutional Council in that regard?

A.

No.

That was not my understanding.

(Catron 217-218).

On January 10, 1973, Broadbent informed the Institutional Council that funds invested as of June 30, 1972 had come
from the unrestricted general account, the auxillary fund,
development funds, loan funds, endowment funds, plant funds,
agency funds, and investment pool gains.

(Deposition Ex.

850).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING BOSWORTH'S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND IN GRANTING THE UNIVERSITY'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A.

The Allegations Of The University's First
Amended Complaint Fail To State A Claim
Against Bosworth Upon Which Relief Can Be
Granted.

Assuming arguendo that the security transactions at
issue were ultra vires or illegal, the University's First
Amended Complaint nevertheless fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.

-9-
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Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint alleges merely that
(1) Catron was the University's Investment Officer; (2) at
the request of Catron, Bosworth executed securities orders
for the University;

(3) the only monies available to Catron

for payment were in the custody and/or possession of the
University;

(4) said payments were ultra vires.

The Univer-

sity alleges no wrongdoing against Bosworth.
Where parties to an illegal or ultra vires contract
are in pari delicto the courts will refuse to enforce rights
arising therefrom, not only where the contract is executory,
but also when the agreement has been executed.

Restatement

of Contract, §598 (1932).
Even if Bosworth is charged with knowledge that the
University's securities purchases were illegal or ultra
vires, the University would be in pari delicto because it
similarly would be charged with such knowledge.

Indeed,

the University should have the greater responsibility to
know the legal limits of its own actions.

This being so,

the court should leave the parties where it finds them and
deny the University rescission of the executed transactions.
This result would conform to the law regarding illegal
contracts and would be consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court decision in First Equity Corporation of Florida v.
Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975).

In First

-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Equity, a broker sued the University to recover monies for
securities ordered but not paid for.

Because the trans-

actions were executory and because the court found the
securities transactions to be ultra vires and illegal, the
Court denied the relief prayed for.
The court in First Equity stated:

"Utah State Univer-

sity had no power to enter into an agreement for the purchase
of common stock and the agreement to purchase and pay commissions thereon are ultra vires agreements and unenforceable".
544 P.2d at 893 (emphasis added).

The court specifically

held the ultra vires contracts were unenforceable.

The

ruling is far different than the University's position
asserted here that ultra vires contracts may be unwound in
favor of the University to the severe detriment of the
University's broker-agent.
This result would also conform with the ruling of the
United States Court of Appeals for Tenth Circuit where this
action and other similar actions were taken on appeal
after having been originally brought in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division,
raising federal claims along with the state claims now
presented.

On January 24, 1977, the Tenth Circuit unani-

mously ruled that the University's theory of recovery was
untenable.

-11-
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The argument that the brokers are liable because
they should have known that the stock purchases
by u.s.u. were illegal under Utah law does not
impress us.
U.S.U. seeks to take advantage of
its own wrongful acts.
It would retain the
profits which it has made and recover from the
brokers the losses which it has sustained.
An
ultra vires act of an institutional customer
may no~converted into a wrongful act of the
broker. Utah State University v. Bear, Stearns
& Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168 (1977).
The law of Utah is the same.

In Moe v. Millard County

School District, 54 Utah 144, 179 P. 980 (1919), a contractor
entered into a contract with the Millard County School District to supply fixtures for a school building.

The contract

was declared void because it exceeded the constitutional
debt limit.

While recognizing that the contractor cannot

recover money owing on an ultra vires contract, the Court
also held the contractor would not be required to refund any
of the purchase price previously paid by the school district.
The Court stated:
We cannot perceive the necessity of refunding
the money that was paid as aforesaid.
To that
extent the contract has been executed and there
certainly is no good reason why in equity that
matter should be reopened.
Nor is it necessary to
do that in order to reflect justice between the
parties.
If there were but one article that had
been sold, or the articles were so united that
they would have to be treated as an entirety,
then, in order to reflect full justice, if plaintiff were given the right to remove and to repossess himself of all he had sold, he should
also be required to refund what he had received.
In this case, however, there are many articles
some of which can be removed while others cannot.
Again, as already stated, a part of the purchase

-12-
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price has been paid and received, and to that
extent the matter, in equity at least, should
be treated as closed.
54 Utah at 151, 179 P. at
983.
In the present case, the University alleges that its
payments to Bosworth were made either ultra vires or under a
mistake of law.

As shown by the Utah Supreme Court in Moe,

the University may not recover regardless of its own or its
agent's mistake.
In a later decision by this Court involving a contract
between the same school district as in Moe and another corporation, the court again left the parties where it found them:
When an ultra vires contract with a corporation
has been fully performed on both sides, neither
party can maintain an action to set aside the
transaction or to recover what has been parted
with.
In other words, neither a Court of Law
nor a Court of Equity will interfere with such
a case to deprive either the corporation or
the other party of mo'ney or property acquired
under the contract. Millard County School District v. State Bank of Millard County, 80 Utah
170, 14 P.2d 967, 972 (1932)(quoting 3 Fletcher,
Cyc. Corpns. §1559, p. 2631) (emphasis added).
The University received precisely what it bargained
for.

The transactions are closed and equity requires that

they remain so.

The University should not be allowed to

take advantage of its own wrongful acts.

The fact that the

University is a public institution expending public monies
does not change the law.

Moe and Millard County School Dis-

trict both involved a public school district.
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Furthermore, the University's alternative theory of
recovery, i.e., that the payments in question were made under
a mistake of law, is unsupported and unsupportable in this
case.

The law is well settled that payments under a mistake

of law may not be recovered.

Restatement of the Law of Resti-

tution, §45; Union Pacific R. Co. v. Dodge County Commissioners,
98 U.S. 541 (1879); Olympic Steamship Co. v. United States,
165 F.Supp. 627 (D.C. Wash. 1958).
B.

Bosworth Acted Only As The University's
Agent.

With respect to the University's investment program,
Bosworth functioned solely as an agent for the University.
Bosworth neither purchased securities from the University
nor sold securities to the University.

Bosworth received

nominal commissions for its services as a broker.

The

University's allegedly ultra vires purchases and sales of
securities were entered into with third party sellers and
buyers, and in no respect with Bosworth.
Even if the University were entitled to damages for
losses, if any, sustained in connection with its investment
program, liability would rest with those who bought from and
sold to the University.

There exists no conceivable theory

upon which such liability could lie against the broker-agent.
An agent is not liable on a contract executed by him on
behalf of another.

Restatement (Second) of Agency, §320 at

-14-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

67 (1958); Fink v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 421 P.2d 735
(Colo. 1966); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Turner
Insurance Agency, Inc., 535 P.2d 664 (Idaho 1975); and
Seigworth v. State, 539 P.2d 464 (Nev. 1975).
In Unger v. Travel Arrangements, Inc., 266 N.Y. Supp.
2d 715, 721

(1966), a customer sued a travel agency to

recover the amount paid for a trip later cancelled by a
steamship company which had become insolvent.

Because the

travel agency had passed the customer's money on to the
steamship company the Court held the most the plaintiff
could recover was any commission retained by the travel
agency.
The reasoning of the Unger case is applicable here.

If

the University may obtain relief from Bosworth, such relief
must be limited to the amounts retained by Bosworth in the
form of commissions.

And under this court's holding in First

Equity, supra, the University's claims are completely barred.
Pursuant to that case, if the University's stock transactions
through Bosworth were ultra vires then the agreement may not
be enforced by either side.

Dicta in First Equity suggesting

that a stock broker for the University, even through an agent
rather than a principal, is nonetheless estopped from enforcing an ultra vires contract does not apply to the present
case because here the broker is not attempting to enforce
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the agreement.

As previously mentioned herein, First Equity

does not hold that the University may unwind its alleged
ultra vires transactions.

~~-

-~~

c.

The University Requested, Initiated And
Ratified The Acts Of Bosworth. The University Is Estopped From Seeking Relief
From Bosworth.

A stockbroker's customer is deemed to have ratified
the acts of the broker, even if the acts were unauthorized,
unless, after becoming aware of the material facts in connection with the acts, the customer promptly repudiates the
broker's conduct.

Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461

( 1901).

Once a customer ratifies his broker's acts, the customer is
estopped from seeking liability against the broker.

Merrill

Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bocock, 247 F.Supp. 373
(S.D. Tex. 1965).
The general issue of ratification and the more specific
issue of whether an alleged repudiation was timely are questions of fact.

Hansen v. Boyd, 161 U.S. 397 (189G).

In this case, there is no dispute as to the following
facts:
1.

The University first became aware of the

question of the propriety of the investment program in
December, 1972;
2.

As early as December, 1972, the University

decided that it should generally cease buying and selling
common stocks;
-16-
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3.

The University did not notify Bosworth until

March, 1973, that Catron, who had been duly authorized by
written resolution of the University to deal with Bosworth,
was no longer authorized to buy stocks on behalf of the
University; and
4.

The bulk of the University trades through

Bosworth occurred between December, 1972, and March, 1973.
Ratification by the University is raised by Bosworth
as an affirmative defense (Bosworth's Answer, 12th Defense).
The above facts and others in the case clearly frame the
issues of ratification and estoppel.

Genuine questions of

fact are presented including (1) when did the Unviersity
first become aware of the material facts in connection with
the alleged impropriety of investing its funds in common
stocks? (2) did the Unversity repudiate its trades made
through Bosworth? (3) if the University repudiated its
trades with Bosworth, was the repudiation timely? and,

(4) by trading in the stock market through Bosworth after
December, 1972, until March, 1973, did the University ratify
the acts of Bosworth thereby estopping any claims of liability against Bosworth?
Even assuming the University has stated a claim for
relief against Bosworth (which Bosworth denies), these
questions need to and must be answered by the trier of fact

-17-
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at a trial.

The lower court erred in granting partial

summary judgment on liability.
Furthermore, under traditional elements of estoppel,
it is clear that this case presents, at the very least, a
question of fact as to whether the University should be
estopped to recover on the transactions in issue.
This Court applied estoppel against a governmental
entity in Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766
(1917).

In doing so, this Court became one of the earliest

to apply estoppel against a governmental body.

In its

opinion, this Court stated:
[T]he municipality by its own affirmative acts,
declarations, and conduct, misled the party, or
induced him to believe that he had the right to
rely upon the assurances which the municipality,
after a long period of time, sought to repudiate
to his injury.
Id.
In Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 594, 116 P.2d
406 (1941), this court expressly reaffirmed the principles
of estoppel applied in Wall.
Of course, not every representation by a government
employee gives rise to a defense of estoppel.

But where, as

here, high-ranking public officials assure a private company,
which relies on the assurances, estoppel should be applied to
bar recovery.

See Hackett v.City of Otawa, 99 U.S. 86 (1879).

In Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41

(1951), the

plaintiff (Moser) had relied on express written assurances

-18-
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of a State Department officer that he (Moser) would not be
barred from seeking American citizenship if he applied for
an exemption from military service.

In fact, however, a

federal treaty provided that exemption from military service
would bar citizenship.

Hence, the department officer's

assurances to Moser constituted an ultra vires promise to
him.

In allowing Moser to obtain citizenship despite the

express provisions of the treaty, the United States Supreme
Court explained:
Petitioner had sought information and guidance
from the highest authority to which he could turn.
He was led to believe that he would not
thereby lose his rights to citizenship.
If he had
known otherwise he would not have claimed exemption.
In justifiable reliance on this advice he
signed the papers sent to him by the Legation.
In this case, Bosworth

~sked

for and received from the

University an express assurance of the propriety of the University's conduct before Bosworth agreed to open an account
for the University.

As was Moser, Bosworth was "lulled • •

into misconception of the legal consequences" of its actions.
Under such circumstances, the lower court should have held
that the University is estopped, as a matter of law, from
recovery.

At the very least, the lower court should have

allowed the question of estoppel to go to the trier of fact.
Every element of estoppel, as applied against governmental bodies in the aforementioned decisions and in many
others, is present in this action:
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1.

The party to be estopped knew the facts.

In

this case, University officers and its Institutional Council
were fully advised of the University's investment program,
the kinds of stocks being purchased and sold, and the
precise identity, cost and sales price of every stock
actually purchased and sold;
2.

The University intended that its conduct

would be acted upon.

The University's corporate resolution

was obviously designed to allow the University to open and
maintain an account with Bosworth;
3.

The party raising estoppel was ignorant of

the true facts;
4.

The party (Bosworth) seeking to invoke

estoppel relied to its detriment on the University's conduct.
The lower court erred in granting the University's
Motion for Summary Judgment.

The University's case against

Bosworth should have been dismissed as a matter of law
because the University is estopped from seeking relief.
In the alternative, there exist genuine material issues of
fact with respect to the issue of estoppel to be resolved by
a trier of fact at trial.
D.

The University Had Authority To Invest
In Securities.

The University's complaint asserts that the University
did not have the power to enter orders with Bosworth for the
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purchase of securities.
had such power.

As a matter of law the University

The University has a traditional legislative

general grant of authority to handle its finances.

The Utah

State Legislature has specifically granted the University
power to invest in the securities at issue here.
In 1888, the Territorial Assembly authorized the existence and operation of an agricultural college which later
became known as Utah State University.

(Chapter 2, Compiled

Laws of Utah 1888, p. 663, §§1852-1857, 1862, 1868, 1870).
In doing so, the Assembly provided for the Governor and
Secretary of the Territory and five county assessors to be
trustees of the college.

Section 4 of the Act specified the

powers of the trustees:
Said trustees shall take charge of the general
interest of the institutio~, and shall have power
to enact by-laws and rules for the regulation of
all of its concerns, not inconsistent with the
laws of the territory. They shall have the
general control and supervision of the agricultural college, the farm pertaining thereto, and
such lands that may be vested into the college
by territorial legislation, of all appropriations
made by the territory for the support of the same,
and also of lands that may hereafter be donated
by the territory, or the United States, or by
any person or corporation, in trust for the promotion of argicultural and industrial pursuits.
(Emphasis added}.
In 1892, the Territorial Assembly amended the Act of
1888 and created a Board of Trustees to be appointed by the
governor.

The enumerated powers of the Board did not differ

substantially from those of its predecessor, except that the
-21-
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1892 amendment also empowered the Board "to exercise such
other powers as might be incidental or necessary to carry
out the express powers".

Spence v. Utah State Agricultural

College, 225 P.2d 18, 23 (Utah 1950).
In 1896, the Utah State Constitution was enacted.
Article

x,

Section 4 states:

University and Agricultural College Located -Rights and Immunities Confirmed.
The location and
establishment by existing laws of the University
of Utah and the Agricultural College are hereby
confirmed, and all of the rights, immunities,
franchises and endowments heretofore granted or
conferred, are hereby perpetuated unto said
University and Agricultural College, respectively.
This Constitutional provision perpetuated into Utah's
law all "rights, immunities, franchises and endowments"
enjoyed by the University under the enabling Act of 1888
including, of course, the "general" power vested in the
Board of Trustees to "control and supervise all appropriations" of the University.
In 1969, the Legislature enacted the "Higher Education
Act of 1969" now Utah Code Ann. §53-48-1 - §53-48-25 (1953).
This Act eliminated the Board of Trustees and the Coordinating Council and in their stead created a State Board of
Higher Education in which was vested the "control, management and supervision of

Utah State University

Utah Code Ann. §53-48-4 (1953).

The Section added:

Except as specifically provided by law, the Board
shall succeed to the powers, duties, authorities
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II

and responsibility heretofore held and exercised
by the governing bodies of the aforementioned
institutions and by the Coordinating Council of
Higher Education.
Thus, the Coordinating Council of Higher Education has
the power, previously granted by the Board of Trustees, to
have "general control and supervision of the college •
of all appropriations made by the State of Utah • • •
for the support of same."
Throughout this legislative history, the legislature
and the Utah Constitution have granted general authority to
the University to handle its appropriations.
There are also other specific legislative grants of
power to the University which permit investments in the
securities now under consideration.
Utah Code Ann. §53-32-4 (1953) states:
The Utah State Agricultural College in its corporate capacity may take by purchase, grant, gift,
devise or bequest any property real or personal
for the use of any department of the college or
for any purpose appropriate to the objects of the
college.
It may convert property received by
gift, grant, devise or bequest and not suitable
for uses into other property so available or into
money.
Such property so received or converted
shall be held, invested and managed and the
proceeds thereof used by the Board of Trustees for
the purposes and under the conditions prescribed
in the grant or donation."
(Emphasis added).
This section specifically allows the University to
invest in any property, real or personal, received by
purchase, grant, gift, devise or bequest.
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Section 53-48-20 (3) of the Higher Education Act also
authorized universities to accept contributions, grants or
gifts from private corporations or persons in governmental
agencies for certain research programs.

It also authorized

the universities to "retain, accumulate, invest, commit and
expend funds and proceeds from authorized programs."
Apparently the University's assertion that it did not
have the power to invest in the securities listed is based
upon Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1

(1953) which, by its own terms,

merely supplements the powers of municipal bodies to invest
in securities.

Utah Code Ann. §33-1-3 (1953) states:

The provisions of this Act are supplemental to
any and all other laws relating to and declaring
what shall be legal investment for the persons,
corporation, organizations and officials referred
to in this Act.
Any reliance by the University on the common law
Dillon's Rule in municipal law is also misplaced.

Dillon's

Rule states that a municipality only enjoys such powers as
are expressly granted by constitutional or legislative
provision.

Even if Dillon's Rule applies to the University

it in no respect means that the University has no power to
invest in securities.

The University has been given a

general and specific grant of authority to so invest.
Furthermore, Dillon's Rule has no application to the
University because the University is not a municipality.
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See Condor v. University of Utah, 123 Utah 182, 257 P.2d 367
( 1953}.
Reading all of the laws together, the University's
position that Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1 (1953) prohibits
investments in common stock is without foundation.
Bosworth recognizes that this Court held in First Equity
v. Utah State University, 544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975), that at
least some of the University's funds could not be invested
in common stocks.

Bosworth asserts that this Court should

now reconsider and overrule its decision in First Equity on
the grounds set forth in this section of Bosworth's Brief.
However, even if the court does not overrule its decision in
First Equity, Bosworth is nevertheless entitled to the
relief it seeks on appeal in this case on the basis of all
other arguments asserted in this Brief.

In First Equity,

this Court held that a broker is not entitled to enforce an
executory contract to purchase securities because the securities were outside the ambit of Utah Code Ann. §33-1-1
(1953).

In so holding, this Court simply applied the

longstanding rule that parties to an illegal contract will
be left where the court finds them.

The holding in First

Equity in no respect supports the University's position in
this case that the securities transactions should be undone
and that Bosworth, the agent-broker should be held liable
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for any losses sustained by the University.
E.

The University's Claim Against Bosworth Is
Barred By The Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act.

The Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Utah Code Ann.
§22-1-1 et. seq.
against Bosworth.

(1953) precludes a finding of liability
Pursuant to the act, the University and

Catron, as its agent, had authority to invest in securities.

Utah Code Ann. §53-32-4 (1953) states:
The Utah State Agricultural College • • • in
its corporate capacity may take by purchase,
grant, gift, devise or bequest any property real
or personal for the use of any department of the
college and for any purpose appropriate to the
objects of the college.
It may convert property
received by gift, grant, devise or bequest and not
suitable for its uses into other property so
available or into money.
Such property so received or converted shall be held, invested and
managed and the proceeds thereof used by the board
of trustees for the purposes and under the conditions described in the grant or donation.
This section specifically allows the University to

invest in any property, real or personal, received by
purchase, grant, gift, devise or bequest.
Similarly, the Higher Education Act of 1969, ch. 138
§20(3), Utah Code Ann. §53-48-20(3) authorizes state universities to accept contributions, grants or gifts from
private corporations or persons in governmental agencies
for research programs and concomitantly, to "retain, accumulate, invest, commit and expend funds and proceeds from such
authorized programs."
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Under the Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act, Catron, in
dealing with Bosworth, was acting as a fiduciary.

The act

defines fidicuiary as follows:
[A]
Trustee, under any trust, expressed, implied,
resulting or constructive, executor, administrator
guardian, conservator, curator, receiver, trustee
in banktuptcy, assignee for the benefit of creditors, partner, agent, officer of a corporation,
public or private, public officer and any other
person acting in a fiduciary capacity for any
person, trust or estate.
Utah Code Ann. §22-1-1
( 1953).
Catron was clearly an "agent, officer of a corporation,
public or private, or a public officer".
Since Catron was a fiduciary, and since the University
had the authority to invest part of its money in common
stocks, the Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act relieves Bosworth
from inquiring as to whether the fiduciary had the power
to invest all monies under his control if he had the power
to invest any of them.

The Act also provides that:

If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn
by a fiduciary as such, or in the name of its

principal by a fiduciary empowered to draw
such instrument in the name of its principal,
the payee is not bound to inquire whether the
fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligations as a fiduciary in drawing or delivering
the instrument, and is not chargeable with
notice that the fiduciary is committing a
breach of his obligation as fiduciary, unless
he takes the instrument with actual knowledge
of such breach or with knowledge of such facts
of his action in taking the instrument amounts
to bad faith.
Utah Code Ann. §22-1-5 (1953).
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The depositions taken in this action to date show that
neither the University nor Catron knew the specific source
of the funds used for any individual common stock transaction.

Part of the money came from grant, gift, devise,

or bequest and from contributions, grants and gifts from
private corporations which, clearly, the University had
the power to invest in securities.

(Catron 58).

Therefore,

pursuant to the Utah Uniform Fiduciaries Act, §22-1-5,
Bosworth, as a matter of law, cannot be held liable to the
University.

The lower court should have dismissed this

suit.
F.

The University May Not Recover From
Bosworth Because Bosworth Reasonably
And In Good Faith Changed Its Position
In Reliance Upon The Regularity Of The
Transactions At Issue.

During a period covering several months, Bosworth acted
as the University's broker-agent and negotiated numerous
purchases and sales of securities on the University's behalf.
For its services, Bosworth retained only its earned commissions.

By so acting on behalf of the University, Bosworth

reasonably and in good faith changed its position in reliance
on the regularity of the transactions engaged in by the
University through Bosworth.

Under such circumstances, the

University should, in equity, be precluded from undoing those
transactions.

-28-
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In Maricopa County v. Cities and Towns, 467 P.2d 949
(Ariz. 1970), a county sued to recover tax funds mistakenly
disbursed to defendant cities and towns.

The Arizona court

recognized that the county had a legitimate claim for
restitution, but denied recovery because (1) the defendants
had no prior notice of the payments, (2) the funds had been
spent, and (3) !aches.

The court stated:

No claimant, however, has an absolute right to
restitution for an enriching benefit, mistakenly
conferred.
Comment C under §1 of the Restatement
of Restitution states:
"Even where a person has
received benefit from another, he is liable to pay
therefor only if the circumstances of its receipt
or retention are such that, as between the two
persons, it is unjust for him to retain it." 4687
P.2d at 953.
The reasoning and holding in Maricopa County are equally applicable here.

An action for restitution (which the

University seeks in this case) is necessarily based upon
fundamental equitable principles.

In equity, the Univer-

sity's claim for restitution against Bosworth cannot be
sustained.
G.

The University's Claim Is Barred By The
Equitable Doctrine Of Unclean Hands.

The University, in asking for a rescission of the
contracts, is seeking equitable relief.
will not be given to a party whose
his own wrongdoing.

~njury

Equitable relief
or loss is due to

For the purposes of the University's
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Motion for Summary Judgment asserted below, it must be taken
as true that the University affirmatively and wrongfully
induced Bosworth to act to its detriment.

It also must be

taken as true that the University had knowledge that its
authority to invest in common stocks out of public monies
was in question in December, 1972, but that it failed to
notify Bosworth of such question until March, 1973, during
which period of time most of the University's transactions
through Bosworth occurred.
It also must be taken as true that Bosworth has neither
committed a wrongful act nor breached any judicially recognized duty to the University.

Before these transactions

were undertaken, the Institutional Council expressly warranted
to Bosworth that the University had the capacity and authority
to engage in the transactions.

Bosworth, after taking great

pains to inquire into the issues of capacity and authority
by the University, reasonably assumed that those members of
the Institutional Council charged by law with supervising
the University investments would be familiar with limitations, if any, on its investment powers and would not have
authorized the transactions had there been any doubt as to
their validity.
Wall v. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593, 168 P. 766 (1917)
involved a municipality

whic~

had, by its own affirmative
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declarations, misled a third party and induced him to
believe that an agent for the municipality was authorized.
The court held that the third party had the right to rely
upon those assurances which the municipality sought to
repudiate:
[T]he municipality, by its own affirmative
acts, declarations, and conduct, misled the party,
or induced him to believe that he had the right
to rely upon the assurances which the municipality,
after a long period of time, sought to repudiate
to his injury.
SO Utah at 601.
Similarly, the Court in Marin v. Calmenson, 197 N.W.
262, stated:
No one should be permitted to plead his own wrong
to relieve himself from the obligations of an
executed contract, the benefits of which he retains.
The innocence or ignorance of the creditor is not essential to his right to enforce the
contract, because the principle of estoppel is
not applied, but the fundamental principle that
one who seeks equity must do equity and may not
accept the benefits and repudiate the burdens of
his contract.
In this case, the University has not done equity and,
therefor, may not turn to equity for relief.
H.

To Allow The University To Recover Would
Be In Violation Of Bosworth's Constitutional Right Of Due Process Of Law.

To allow the University to recover against Bosworth
un~er

the circumstances of the present case would be contrary

to fundamental notions of fairness and justice in violation
of Bosworth's due process rights under both the Utah and
United States Constitutions.
-31-
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In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607 (1947) the United
States Supreme Court held that "fundamental notions of
fairness and justice . • • lie embedded in the feelings of
the American people and are enshrined in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment".

Summarily, the United

States Supreme Court stated the following in Malinkski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1944):
[J]udicial review of that guaranty of the Fourteenth Amendment inescapably imposes upon the
Court an exercise of judgment upon the whole course
of the proceedings in order to ascertain whether
they offend those canons of decency and fairness
which express the notions of justice of Englishspeaking peoples.
324 U.S. at 417.
There is a long tradition in the Courts of this country
requiring legislation, both state and federal, to comport
with "fundamantal notions of fairness and justice" contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment.

This requirement that

legislation work a fair result has been recently applied in
City of Edmund v. Wakefield, 537 P.2d 1211

(Okla. 1975):

If the ordinance in question deprived no one of
constitutionally protected procedural rights,
then this Court must concern itself with the
issues of the basic fairness and reasonableness
of the ordinance.
In essence, substantive due
process of law, independently of any procedural
rights guaranteed by constitutional provisions,
is the general requirement that all governmental
actions have a fair and reasonable impact on the
life, liberty, or property of the person affected.
537 P.2d at 1213.
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It would be grossly unfair to hold Bosworth liable to the
University in this case.

Bosworth did everything reasonably

within its power to determine the validity of its dealings
with the University and was assured not only with oral
representations that the University had the power to invest
in securities, but also with a written corporate resolution
to that effect.
I.

There Is A Question Of Fact As To Whether
Plaintiff Suffered Any Loss.

There is a genuine question of fact as to whether the
University in fact suffered any loss resulting from its
investments.

The State of Utah by its Legislature reimbursed

the University in the 1974 Budget Session for losses incurred
from the University's securities transactions.
mental Appropriations Act,
1974, Chap. 39, Sec. 1.

Sen~te

See Supple-

Bill No. 38, Laws of Utah,

If a party has suffered no loss in

fact, he has no claim for relief.

See Estate Counseling

Services, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
303 F.2d 527, 533 (L.A. 10 1962); Chaney v. Western States
Title Insurance Co., 292 F.Supp. 376 (D.C. Utah 1968);
Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, et al., 357 F.Supp. 1331 (D.C.
Ill. 1973).
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POINT II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
BOSWORTH'S THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS.
A.

Bosworth's Third-Party Complaint For
Indemnity And Contribution Stated Claims
Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted.

Bosworth's Third-Party claims are directed against the
University's officers and members of its Institutional Council
and are based on theories of implied contract, warranty, implied
warranty, misrepresentation, indemnity, subrogation and
conduct outside the scope of authority.
The court below granted the third-party defendants'
Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.

In so doing, the lower court held as

a matter of law that under no conceivable state of facts
could those persons who actively implemented and supervised
the University's investment program be held liable to Bosworth.
The lower court erred in dismissing Bosworth's thirdparty claims.

Bos~urLh's

third-party action was based on

express assurances to Bosworth from the third-party defendants
that the University had the authority to invest in common
securities.

Under well-settled principles of law, those

express assurances of capacity and authority gave rise to an
implied contract to indemnify Bosworth from any loss it may
suffer as a result of Bosworth's reasonable reliance on such
assurances.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-34-

If Bosworth is only constructively at fault in this
case,

(i.e., if Bosworth is charged only with constructive

notice of the illegality of the University's investment),
then it is entitled to full indemnity for any of its losses
as a result of reliance on representations by the Institutional Council and other University officials.

On the other

hand, even if the court were to determine, at trial, that
Bosworth is equally culpable with the Institutional Council
members and other University officials, then at least
Bosworth's third-party claims for contribution from those
individuals constitute claims upon which relief can be
granted under general principles of law applicable to joint
wrongdoers.
Bosworth is entitled to seek the relief sought by its
third-party action because it fulfilled its duty of inquiry
regarding the University's authority.

This court held in

First Equity Corp. of Florida v. Utah State University,
544 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975), that persons dealing with public
officers have a duty to inquire into the limits of their
authority.

Under the circumstances of this case, there is

no quesiton that Bosworth fulfilled such a duty.

Bosworth

did all that could possibly be expected to satisfy itself
that the University had authority to deal in securities.

-35-
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il

After having been approached by the University's agent,
Catron, Bosworth went directly to the principal, the University's Institutional Council, and received written assurances that the University had authority to deal in the
stock market through Bosworth.

Under these facts, pursuant

to general principles of the law of warranty, those acting
on behalf of the University in assuring Bosworth that the
University had the capacity to deal and invest in securities
are strictly liable to Bosworth if those assurances prove to
be false.

The purpose of the law of warranty is to relieve

the one assured of his duty to inquire further into the
facts for himself.

Paccon, Inc. v. United States, 399

F.2d 162 (Ct. of Cl. 1968); Hoover v. Nielson, 510 P.2d 760
(Ariz. 1973); Quagliana v. Exquisite Home Builders, Inc.,
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975).
The law in Utah is that one only constructively liable
to an injured party may recover either contribution, indemnity, or subrogation from the person primarily responsible.
Holmstead v. Abbott G.M. Diesel, Inc., 493 P.2d 625 (Utah
1972)

["While the master may be jointly sued with the servant

for a tort of the latter

they are not joint tort-

feasors in the sense that they are equal wrongdoers without
the right of contribution, for the master may recover from the
servant the amount of loss caused to him by the tort, • • . . "]
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Hoggan v. Cahoon, 73 P. 512 (Utah 1903); Culmer v. Wilson,
44 P. 833 (Utah 1896).
Under the circumstances of this case, Bosworth is clearly
entitled to seek indemnity, contribution or subrogation from
the third-party defendants.
B.

Bosworth's Third-Party Claims Are Not
Barred By Sovereign Immunity.

The court below granted third-party defendants' Motions
to Dismiss Bosworth's third-party claims without setting forth
any reasons for the dismissals in its Memorandum Decision.
(R. 1775).

The only clues provided by the lower court as to its
reasons for dismissing the third-party action were two
statements it made in the course of other rulings.

At a

hearing before the lower court on April 19, 1978, Judge
Christofferson explained that his decision to grant the
third-party defendants' Motions to Dismiss was based "primarily on immunity".

Tr. 68.

And, the court also noted, in

its final decision granting the University's motions for
partial summary judgment, that:
This Court feels that the brokers cannot escape
liability for their illegal acts, acts with which
they are charged legally with knowing to be
illegal by saying officials of Utah State also
knew this and were charged with this knowledge.
The Court feels that where a governmental entity
is involved and parties are charged with the
illegal use of public funds that the other illegal
party cannot escape liability by saying the
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specific party we dealt with does not come into
this matter with clean hands either.
Thus, according to the lower court, if one "illegal
party" is a governmental entity and the other "illegal party"
is a private company, the private company is always strictly
liable for any losses sustained by the government.
position is legally untenable.

Such a

The third-party action

should not have been dismissed.
Bosworth's third-party claims are not barred by immunity.

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.

§§68-30-3, et. seq.

(1953), has no application to the

third-party defendants.

That Act applies only to "govern-

mental entities", not to employees of governmental entities.
Recognizing this, the third-party defendants argued in the
court below that they were entitled to common law "official
immunity."

T. 87.

This court's holding and reasoning in Cornwall v. Larsen,
571 P.2d 925 (Utah 1977) are applicable in the present case.
In Cornwall, the plaintiff was injured in a collision
between the automobile in which he was riding and a vehicle
operated by a deputy sheriff.

Suit was brought against the

county, the deputy sheriff and the sheriff.

The trial

court dismissed the suit as to all defendants, but this
Court reversed the dismissal against the sheriff, the deputy
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sheriff and other named individuals, ruling that a claim for
relief had been made as to the individual defendants because
of the plaintiff's assertions that (1) the employees in
question were negligent, even though acting within the scope
of their authority, and (2) the acts of the officer driving
the emergency vehicle were wilful, unlawful and in excess of
his authority.

Id. at 927.

This Court also expressly

relied upon its earlier decision in Sheffield v. Turner, 21
Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968).
In Sheffield this court noted that immunity of an
individual government employee is derivative of the immunity
of the sovereign.

Accordingly, because the officer sued in

Sheffield was engaged in the exercise of a governmental
(rather than proprietary) function of the sovereign, he was
protected unless he was acting outside the scope of his
authority.

Id. at 316-317.

The allegations of the third-party complaint filed by
Bosworth meet the requirements for stating a claim for
relief in accordance with Cornwall and Sheffield.

Bosworth

has alleged that the conduct of the University's officers
wilfully exceeded the scope of their authority, that those
officers were negligent in not ascertaining that the securities transactions in question might be

~

vires or
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illegal, and that the officers knew, or should have known,
of such illegality.

Bosworth also states a claim for relief

by alleging that the officers and Institutional Council
members failed to notify Bosworth, at the earliest possible
time, of the revocation of Catron's authority.
Whenever a public officer exceeds his authority in
carrying out either ministerial or discretionary duties, he
may be held personally liable to a private party injured by
his actions.

Bosworth's third-party complaint stated claims

against the Institutional Council members and other University officials for acts outside their statutory authority,
the reasoning being that (1) if the University is entitled
to recover from Bosworth, it will do so on the sole basis
that the securities transactions were ultra vires, i.e., not
authorized by statute, and (2) if the University lacks statutory capacity to engage in securities transaction,

(3) then

the Institutional Council members and other University
officials similarly lack statutory authority to open an
account with Bosworth to deal in securities or to issue a
corporate resolution that the University has such authority.
Thus, the acts of the Institutional Council members and other
University officials are not protected by common law official
immunity.
authority.

Said persons clearly exceeded their statutory
Logan City v. Allen, 86 Utah 375, 44 P.2d 1085
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(1935); Blonquist v. Summit County, 25 Utah 2d 387, 483 P.2d
430 (1971); and Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 527, 57 P.2d
1128 (1936)

[no public officer may "claim immunity for the

commission of an act entirely outside the scope of his
official duties"].
Furthermore, to the extent the immunity of the Institutional Council members and other University officers is
derivative of the immunity of the University, immunity as to
those persons is not proper because the acts here sued upon
clearly involved proprietary and not governmental functions
of the University.

See, e.g., Greenhalgh v. Payson City,

530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975)

["It is therefore our conclusion

that proprietary functions of a municipality are not within
the coverage of the Utah Governmental Act"].

The conduct

here at issue is clearly proprietary because the sole
purpose of the University's investment program was to make
money by competing with private investors in commercial
securities markets.

See Greenhalgh, supra.
POINT III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING BOSWORTH'S
MOTION FOR CHANGE OF VENUE.
Bosworth's principal place of business is in Colorado.
At all times material to this case, it has maintained only

-41-
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one branch office in Utah, located in Salt Lake County.

The

University is located in Logan, Cache County, Utah.
No significant acts in connection with the various
transactions between the University and Bosworth were
performed in Cache County.

(R. 94, 95 and 136).

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-13-8 (1953), Bosworth
moved the lower court for a change of venue to Salt Lake
County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-13-9(1)

(1953) which

allows the court to change the place of trial "when the
county designated in the Complaint is not the proper county".
The grounds of the motion were that Bosworth resides in
Salt Lake County and that the contracts complained of, if
performed in Utah, were performed in Salt Lake County.
The Motion for Change of Venue was denied by the lower
court holding Bosworth subject to trial in Cache County on
the ground that Cache County was the residence of the
University.
The University alleges in its First Amended Complaint
that Utah Code Ann. §8-13-7 (1953) is controlling in this
case.

Bosworth, in support of its Motion for Change of

Venue (R. 138-146), contends that Utah Code Ann. §78-13-4
(1953) is the controlling statute if the University's
allegations establish a cause of action based upon a contract.
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Regardless of which statute controls, however, the only
proper county in which suit may be brought is Salt Lake
County.
A.

Venue in Cache County is improper.
Venue Is Improper In Cache County Under Utah
Code Ann. §78-13-7 (1953).
Section 78-13-7 (1953) states:

In all other cases the actions must be
tried in the county in which the cause of action
arises, or in the county in which any defendant
resides at the commencement of the action; provided that if any such defendant is a corporation,
any county in which such corporation has its
principal off ice or place of business shall be
deemed the county in which such corporation
resides within the meaning of this section.
If
none of the defendants resides in this state,
such action may be commenced and tried in any
county of which the plaintiff may designate in his
complaint; and if the defendant is about to depart
from the state, such action may be tried in any
county where any of the parties resides or service
is had, subject, however, to the power of the
court to change the 'place of trial as provided by
law.
As applied to this case, §78-13-7 requires that the
action be tried (1) in the county where the action arises or
(2) where the defendant resides.
The Utah Supreme Court has defined a "cause of action"
as "either the violation of a legal obligation or the
omission to perform a duty imposed by law of the condition
of a wrong by a person which results in injury to another,
and of either the actual damage, or the damage implied by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-43-

law caused thereby."

Fields v. Daisy Gold Mining Co., 73 P.

521 (Utah 1903).
The gist of the University's cause of action, if any,
is that Catron exceeded his authority in purchasing and
selling speculative stock on behalf of the University, that
the University itself had no power to authorize the purchase
or sale of such stock, that Bosworth was allegedly aware of
the limitations of authority and power, and that the University suffered damages caused thereby.
Such a cause of action arose, if at all, in Salt
Lake County, not in Cache County.
(1)

The University's securities trading account with

Bosworth was opened in Bosworth's Salt Lake County office;
(2)

All orders for the purchase or sale of securities

were entered by the University at Bosworth's Salt Lake
County office and were accepted, transmitted and confirmed
by Bosworth at or from its Salt Lake County office;
(3)

All new account documents and authorizations by

the University were submitted to Bosworth's Salt Lake County
office.

(R. 94, 95).

Hence, the facts of the record below affirmatively show
that the cause of action, if any, arose in Salt Lake County
and that Salt Lake County is the "residence" of Bosworth.
Salt Lake County is the only proper venue under Utah Code
Ann. §78-13-7 (1953).
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B.

Venue Is Improper In Cache County Under Utah
Code Ann. §78 13 4 (1953).

Section 78-13-4 pertains to actions on written
contracts:
When the defendant has contracted in writing to
perform an obligation in a particular county of
the state and resides in another county, an action
on such contract obligation may be commenced and
tried in the county where such obligation is to be
performed or in which the defendant resides.
If this case is deemed to be one strictly in contract,
then §78-13-4 would be applicable and venue would be proper
only in the place where the contract was to be performed,
which place of performance was Salt Lake County, or in the
county in which Bosworth resides, also Salt Lake County.
Virtually all of the various transactions between the
University and Bosworth which were contemplated by and arose
out of the original written brokerage agreement were Salt
Lake County based.

All orders for the purchase or sale of

stock on behalf of the University were placed either in
person or by telephone to Bosworth's place of business in
Salt Lake County.

(R.95, 136).

Bosworth's only place of business in Utah was in Salt
Lake County.

(R.94).

Furthermore, if each individual transaction entered
into subsequent to the initial written brokerage agreement
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between the University and Bosworth are considered, then
contracts not in writing serve as the focal point of venue.
In discussing the issue of venue in actions on contracts not
in writing, the Utah Supreme Court in Buckle v. Ogden
Furniture and Carpet Co., 216 P. 684 (Utah 1923) interpreted
the predecessor to §78-13-4 and stated:
Section 6528 relates to actions upon contracts
only, and, if it means anything at all, it means
that, when a defendant has contracted in writing
to perform an obligation in a particular county,
and resides in another county, the action may be
tried in the former county and by plain implication, and the maxim, "expressio unius est excousio
alterius," it means that actions on contracts not
in writing are excluded, and are not authorized to
be tried out of the county where the defendant
resides." 216 P. at 686.
(Emphasis added).
Thus, whether the contract is deemed written or oral
under §78-13-4, the only proper venue for this case is in
Salt Lake County.
Under any of the venue provisions which may be applicable in this case, Cache County is not a proper place
for trial.

The lower court's order denying Bosworth's

Motion for Change of Venue was clearly in error and should
be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The University's position in this case is wholly
unsupportable, both in law and in fact.

Bosworth acted

reasonably and in good faith upon official authorization
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from the University to act as the University's agent.

To

now attempt, as the University is doing in this case, to
hold Bosworth liable to the University for the University's
alleged losses sustained as a result of its activities in
the stock market is repugnant not only to Bosworth's Constitutional rights, but also to basic notions of fairness
and justice.

The lower court clearly erred in denying

Bosworth's motion to dismiss this action.
The lower court further erred in holding Bosworth
liable as a matter of law, in refusing to allow Bosworth's
third-party claims against the very individuals upon whose
assurances Bosworth reasonably relied, and in denying
Bosworth's Motion for Change of Venue.
Accordingly,

Boswor~h

respectfully requests this Court

to reverse the ruling of the court below, directing the
lower court to enter judgment in favor of Bosworth on its
motion to dismiss.
In the alternative, Bosworth requests the court to
reverse the rulings of the Court below in granting the University's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing Bosworth's
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Third-Party Complaint against the individual defendants and
in denying Bosworth's Motion for Change of Venue.
Respectfully submitted,
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Harold G. Christensen
R. Brent Stephens
Dee V. Benson
Attorneys for Appellant Bosworth,
Sullivan and Company
700 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
(801) 521-9000
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